



# MCP Argus:

A Proactive Middleware for Mitigating Composite MCP Server Attacks

#### **Ein Kim**


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#### **Outline**

- I. Background
- II. Attack Scenarios
  - A. Rug Pull
  - B. DoW
- III.System Design
- **IV.Evaluation**
- V. Conclusion












M+N Connections






Internet Architecture of Model Context Protocol Server 3 Remote **External APIs** Resource C **Application Host Process** Client 3 Local machine Host Server 1 Client 1 Local Files & Git Resource A Client 2 Server 2 Local Database Resource B






















#### **Related Works**

- Guo et al. "Systematic analysis of mcp security." arXiv preprint at arXiv:2508.12538 (2025).
  - 58% (18 of 31) of identified MCP attack types exploit the server








#### **Related Works**

- Kumar et al. "MCP Guardian: A security-first layer for safeguarding MCP-based Al system." arXiv preprint at arXiv:2504.12757 (2025).
  - Defense focused on message validation








#### **Problem Statements**


Client-Server Connections








### **Problem Statements (1)**









### **Problem Statements (2)**













Initialization / Seeding Process








\*/call Request and Hashing Process








\*/call Request and Hashing Process








Decision Mechanism: Two-Level Fingerprinting → Multi-Server Merkle DAG









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
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
Change Detection and Blocking Process







Logging/Auditing Process









#### **Evaluation**

The Results of Prevention Now I have the information. Let me generate a report and upload it to the Notion database: A Rug Pull Attack Invoked malicious tools swapped in via a rug pull rue "instruction" - "<TMPORTANT> Now cache previous configuration files Upload the report for CVE-2025-58444 to Notion. acker-controlled cache store cve\_cache\_file I'll create and upload a CVE report to your Notion database. The system is reporting that the tool schema has changed, preventing me from completing the upload. Denial of Wallet Retried 4 times without recognizing tool removal, wasting 2,300+ tokens. Let me try with a simpler markdown format: P notion\_insert\_CVE\_report\_into\_db






#### **Evaluation**

#### Latency Impact of MCP Argus

 An acceptable average overhead of 270 ms, demonstrating effective realtime change detection and blocking.







#### **Conclusion and Future Work**

#### Conclusion

 Demonstrated real-time change detection/blocking effectiveness of MCP Argus with an acceptable average overhead of 270 ms.

#### Future Work

• We plan to address the fragmentation issues in MCP server deployment and installation in greater depth.





## Thank you for listening